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I. SUMMARY
The Atlas-Centaur AC-5 vehicle was launched from ETR Complex 36A on
March 2., 1965 at 8:25.04 a.m. EST. Within about 1 second after launch the
thrust of the Atlas "booster engine decayed rapidly; the vehicle settled back on
the launch pad and was quickly destroyed by fire and explosion. Considerable
damage was sustained by the launch complex and its associated equipment.
Loss of booster engine thrust was due to fuel depletion at the turbopump
inlets, which is attributed to closure of the fuel prevalve or the staging
valve. To preclude the recurrence of either of these fuel valving malfunctions,
the following corrective action has been taken: The remote control actuator
has been replaced by manual operation of the Atlas fuel prevalve; the internal
passage dimensions in the staging valve have been increased to lessen the
hydraulic load on the valve poppet.
In addition to the Atlas fuel system malfunction, a failure in the power
control circuitry of the Centaur guidance computer resulted in partial re-
moval of power at umbilical ejection. To prevent such a guidance system fail-
ure on future flights some redundant circuitry has been eliminated and more
rigorous checkout procedures have been adopted. No further anomalies were
discovered in the telemetered data prior to the Atlas booster thrust decay.
A prime objective of the AC-5 flight was to place a dynamic model of the
Surveyor spacecraft in a simulated lunar transfer trajectory. An important
facet of this problem is the demonstration of a launch-on-time capability in
accordance with the proper Earth-moon relation. The window opening time was
established at 8:25 a.m. EST; thus the actual launch occurred within 4 seconds
of the planned time.
II. INTRODUCTION
The Atlas-Centaur AC-5 vehicle, which was launched from ETR Complex 36A on
March 2, 1965, at 8:25.04 a. m. EST, was the fifth in a series of developmental
flights. Shortly after lift-off, Atlas booster engine thrust was lost, and the
vehicle settled back to the launcher and was destroyed by explosion and fire.
Loss of thrust was caused by fuel starvation of the Atlas booster engines.
This flight was to have been the first to attempt to place a dynamic model
of the Surveyor spacecraft (SD-l) in a simulated lunar transfer trajectory.
(All abbreviations and symbols are defined in the appendix. ) In order to place
the spacecraft in this type of trajectory with a second-stage single-propulsion
phase (direct ascent), the launch vehicle must demonstrate a launch-on-time
capability in accordance with the proper Earth-moon relation. The vehicle was
targeted for the actual lunar opportunity of October 10, 1964. The launch win-
dow opening for this particular day was biased by 7 hours to provide for a day-
light launch that was required for photographic coverage. The resulting win-
dow opening time was established as 8:25 a. m. EST with the actual launch occur-
ring at 8:25.04 a. m. EST thereby successfully demonstrating a lunar launch-on-
time capability.
Several major changes to vehicle systems were incorporated on AC-5:
(1) An advanced Centaur propellant utilization system
(2) A payload separation system '
(3) A Surveyor dynamic model that includes research and development in-
strumentation and an S-band transponder
(4) Uprated Rocketdyne MA-5 propulsion system with 165k booster engines
(5) Agena timer and auxiliary electronic module
The test control parameters for this flight were as follows:
Separation System
(1) To demonstrate the spacecraft separation system
(2) To verify the satisfactory operation of the Atlas-Centaur separation
system
(3) To verify the satisfactory operation of the insulation-panel and nose-
fairing-jettison system
Propulsion System
(l) To verify the ability of the Centaur propulsion system to start in the
flight environment and burn to guidance cutoff
(2) To obtain data on the performance of the Centaur main engine system
(3) To obtain data on the performance of the -HgOg attitude control system
Basic Structure
(1) To verify the structural integrity of the Atlas and Centaur vehicles
during all powered phases of flight
(2) To verify the'structural and thermal integrity of the Centaur nose-
fairing and insulation panels
Guidance System
(1) To verify the integrity of the guidance system
(2) To demonstrate the overall measuring accuracy of the guidance system
(3) To verify that the guidance system provides proper discrete and steer-
ing signals to the Atlas and Centaur flight control systems
(4) To demonstrate that the guidance equations and associated trajectory
parameters are satisfactory
(5) To obtain data on Atlas-Centaur lunar orbit injection accuracy by post-
injection DSIF tracking of the Surveyor dynamic model S-band trans-
ponder
Centaur Vehicle Systems
(1) To verify that the flight control system supplies proper signals for
attitude control and dynamic stability of the Centaur vehicle
(2) To obtain data on the capability of the Centaur to perform a retro-
maneuver
(3) To obtain data on the Centaur propellant-utilization-system perform-
ance
(4) To obtain data on the performance of the Centaur hydraulic, pneumatic,
and electrical systems
(5) To obtain data on the performance of the Centaur RF systems, telemetry,
Azusa, and C-band beacon
(6) To demonstrate the capability of the Agena timer for a one-burn mission
Atlas Vehicle
(l) To obtain data on the performance of all Atlas systems
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(2) To demonstrate the operation of the uprated MA-5 booster engines
(LV-3C), 1.65k pounds of thrust
Launch Capability
(l) To obtain data on the simulated lunar launch-on-time capability (vari-
able launch azimuth) of the Atlas-Centaur
Environment
(1) To obtain data on the spacecraft environment during the launch-to-
spacecraft separation phase of flight
(2) To obtain data on the flight environments, including pressures, temper-
atures, and vibration levels
(3) To obtain data on the orbital, environments, terminal behavior, and
general postmission performance of Centaur systems until loss of all
data links
The AC-5 planned sequence of flight events is presented in table II-I. - A
schematic diagram of the planned flight is^ shown in figure II-l, and an illus-
tration of the general arrangement of the Centaur stage is presented in fig-
ure II-2.
This report consists mainly of an evaluation of the Atlas propulsion system
failure, the Centaur guidance system failure, and their-respective failure •
analyses. Other Atlas and Centaur airborne'systems are evaluated up to vehicle
destruction, including an evaluation of ground-support systems and launchr-area
damage.
TABLE II-I. - PLANNED SEQUENCE OF AC-5 FLIGHT EVENTS (EEF. l)
Event
Guidance to flight mode
Unnull Atlas displacement gyros
Programer start, 2-in. rise
Unnull Atlas servointegrators (8-in. rise)
Activate autopilot control (42-in. rise)
Initiate roll program
Initiate pitch program
LOX tank pressure change
Vent insulation panel purge
Open LHg vent valve command
Displacement and rate gyro gain to low
Enable booster staging
Booster engine cutoff, close LH2 vent valve
command, activate sustainer control,
rate gyro gain to high
Deactivate booster control, null integrators
Deactivate sustainer control/
Jettison booster package
Open LH2 vent valve command ,
Admit .guidance steering, disable displacement
gyros
Jettison insulation panels
Unlatch nose fairings
Fire thrustor bottles
Start Centaur boost pumps, unlatch
insulation-panel hinges
Enable sustainer engine cutoff
. Sustainer engine cutoff, vernier engine
cutoff, start Centaur programer, close
LOX and LH2 vent valves, pressurize LOX
and LHg tanks
Energize electrical disconnect
Programer
time,
sec
BECO + 0
BECO -f 1
BECO + 3 i
BECO +3.1
BECO + 7
BECO + 8
BECO + 30
BECO + 54.5
BECO + 55
BECO + 66
BECO + 88
SECO + 0
SECO + 0. 1
Preflight
nominal
time,
sec
T - 8.37
T - 3.95
T + 0
T + 4
T + 15
T + 20
T + 40
T + 74
T + 110
T + 135
T + 141. 6
T + 142. 6
T + 144. 6
T + 144. 7
T + 148. 6
T + 149. 6
T + 171. 6
T > 196. 1
T + 196. 6
T + 207.6
T + 229.6
T + 238.0
T + 238.1
TABLE II-I. - Concluded. PLANNED SEQUENCE OF AC-5 FLIGHT EVENTS (BEF. l)
Event
Start hydraulic recirculating pump, RJ
segmented signal
Boost pump accelerating valve
Separate first and second stages.
Fire retrorockets
Prestart, steering reference to Centaur
Start main engines, unnull main engine
integrators, energize igniters, low rate
gain
Admit guidance for steering
Reset programer
Unnull KJ signal
PU segmented signal
Enable main engine cutoff
Main engine cutoff, HgOg separate on, HgOg
roll integrator unnulled, lov displacement
gain., high rate gain
MECO backup, PU null
Safe Surveyor destruct
Preseparation arming, extend landing gear,
null main engine integrators
Unlock omni antenna
Preseparation arming off, high power on
Spacecraft electrical disconnect, switch
guidance/spacecraft TIM channels
Separate spacecraft
Start 180° turn, admit guidance for
attitude control
End 180° turn, start hydraulic recircu-
lating pump, prestart, start retrothrust
Calibrate telemetry
Open LOX and LHg vent valves
End retrothrust, power off
Programer
time,
sec
SECO +0.5
SECO +1
SECO + 1. 9
SECO + 2
SECO + 3. 5
SECO + 8. 5
SECO + 12.5
SECO + 30
SECO + 98.5
SECO + 333.5
SECO + 403.5
MECO + 0
SECO + 450. 5 (t)
SECO + 451
t • + 18
t + 28.5
t + 49
t + 54.5
t + 60
t + 65
t + 265
t + 641
t + 1165
t + 1166
Preflight
nominal
time,
sec
T + 238.5
T + 239.0
T + 239.9
T + 240.0
T + 241.5
T + 246.5
T + 250.5
T + 268.0
T + 336.5
T + 571.5
T + 641.5-
T + 664.0
T + 688.5
T + 689.0
T + 706.5
T + 717.0
T + 737.5
T + 743.0
T + 748.5
T + 753.5
T + 953.5
T + 1329.5
T + 1853.5
T + 1854.5
Fire Atlas
retrorockets;
SECO + 2.0 sec7
Lunar transfer
orbit injection
T + 11 min
4.0 sec
T+ 12 min
28.5 sec
T + 12min
33.5 sec
Atlas-Centaur
separation phase
(unstabilized coast)-\
T + 4 min
6.5 sec
T + 3 min
58 sec
(nominal)
s
x
Programed
pitchover;
T +15 sec
to BECO—1
Atlas
booster
phase
LH2 and LOX boost
pumps started;
BECO + 66.0-X
x
Guidance admitted N
for steering control
during Atlas sustainer
phase;
BECO+ 8.0 sec
(150.01-x
\ • •
Atlas \
booster N-
jettison-^
T + 2min
22.0 sec
(nominal)
-Booster
jettison;
BECO+ 3.1 sec
•Jettison xx
nose fairing; ^~-
BECO + 55.0 sec
(197.0)
Jettison
insulation panels -
BECO + 30.0 sec
1172.0)
/
Guidance admitted for
steering control during
Centaur burn;
~>-.^  MES + 4.0 sec
Chilldowri-~-MES;'Main engine start;
^O5 sec) ' attitude engines off;
^^ SECO+ 8.5 sec (246.5)
^- Atlas-Centaur ~~
separation;
SECO+ 1.9 sec
—SECO and VECO;
Surveyor dynamic model
.separation phase (rate
stabilized coast)
k
-Reorientation maneuver
(turnaround) 200 sec
Centaur
— retromaneuver phase
Ret roth rust
;
propellant
jlowdown)
101 sec
T + 30 min
54.5 sec
i /- LH
Surveyor dynamic model
postretromaneuver;
remaining RF transmission
capability (estimated)
Telemetry (RF 3 and 4) none;
• RF output disconnected from
TLM antenna at separation
Tracking (S-band) 20 hr7
-Guidance vector
admitted for pitch and yaw
reference during retro-
maneuver;
MECO + 89.5sec(753.5)\ '
\ '-Surveyor dynamic model separation;
\ MECO+ 84.5 sec (748.5) '
\2 and LOX vent valves
electrically unlocked; ,
MECO +1189.5 sec /
(1853.5) /
BECO +196 sec
(238.0)
Centaur engine prestart; ,
(energize LOX and LHj prestart
solenoids); SECO + 3.5 sec
MECO;
LOX and LH2 prestart \
valves opened to ^
blowdown residual \
propellants through \
main engines; \
MECO+ 289.5 sec (953.5)-
•^Centaur mission\
completion; x-Centaur
electrical power
changeover; LH2
and LOX prestart
valves closed;
MECO+ 1190.5
(1854.5)
postretromaneuver;
remaining RF trans-
mission capability
(estimated)
Telemetry (RFl and 2)
5.5 hr; tracking
(C-band) 35 hr
approximately
142.0 sec
from launch
Programed roll
to variable
azimuth
depending on
time of launch
(90° to 111°)
main engines off; \ \
enable attitude \ '-Centaur Payload Preparation Events
engines for control; \
MES+ 417.5 (664.0H (l) Simulated functions: Supporting research and
development for operational Surveyor missions
(Centaur programer signals only).
MECO + 25.0seC: Safe Surveyor destruct system
MECO + 42.5 sec; Surveyor preseparation system
MECO + 42.5 sec: Extend Surveyor landing legs
MECO + 53.0 sec: Extend Surveyor omni antennas
(2) Active functions; Supporting Surveyor dynamic
model separation
MECO + 73.5 sec: Turn on S-band transponder high power transmitter
MECO + 79.0 sec: Separate electrical disconnect
MECO + 79.0 sec: Switch Centaur TLM to separation channels
Launch pad alinement
105° (true)
Launch time depends
on day of launch window
Figure II-1-. - Planned AC-5 flight compendium (ref. 1).
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III. PRELAUNCH HISTORY
Summary
Prior to launching, the flight vehicle undergoes a series of preflight
tests, which consist of (l) propellant tanking integrated test, (2) flight
acceptance and composite test, and (3) composite readiness test, to ensure that
all airborne and ground-support systems are within specifications to support a
successful launch.
Arrival and Erection
The Atlas 156D booster arrived at ETR on January 7, 1965, followed by the
Centaur 6C, and the interstage adapter (I/A) on January 9. The Atlas-Centaur
launch vehicle erection started on January 14 with the Atlas 156D booster, I/A
on January 15, and Centaur 6C on January 16. .
Propellant Tanking. Integrated Test .
The propellant tanking integrated test (quad tanking, ref. l) is conducted
to verify that the launch vehicle can be tanked with propellants and that all
vehicle and spacecraft systems will function properly under cryogenic condi-
tions and in a radiofrequency environment. This test was conducted on Febru-
ary 11 for AC-5. Prior to the tanking test, two problems were encountered dur-
ing the Atlas RP-1 tanking. The first was a leaking flex line in the ground
transfer system that required replacement, and the second was a leak in the sus-
tainer turbopump seals. This leak occurred after a pressure of 60 psig was
reached (sequence II). The decision was to close the fuel prevalves and proceed
with the tanking test. The test began at 1730 EST and proceeded normally
through T - 0 with no holds except the 40-minute built-in hold at T - 10 min-
utes. Other than the leak in the sustainer turbopump seal, the test was com-
pleted with satisfactory results.
Special RP-1 Tanking Test
On February 15, this special tanking test was conducted to verify the sus-
tainer turbopump seal leak and to record the leakage rate.. Prior to the tank-
ing of RP-1, the turbopump was pressurized to 30 psig with gas, and flowmeters
were attached to the seal drain lines. This gas leakage test was conducted
under both static and dynamic conditions. A leakage of 0.7 standard cubic inch
per minute was recorded under dynamic conditions. RP-1 was tanked, and only a
slight amount of leakage was evident. This leakage ceased after the tank pres-
sures were cycled several times between 13 and 60 psig (sequences I and II);
as a result, the existing sustainer engine was used.
13
Flight Acceptance Composite Test
The flight acceptance composite test (FACT, ref. 2) was conducted to verify
that the combined Atlas-Centaur-Surveyor dynamic model system is capable of op-
eration with no detrimental interference when subjected to conditions simulating
flight. This test for AC-5 was conducted on February 18. The test began at
1443 EST and proceeded normally until T - 5 minutes at which time a preplanned
guidance "no-go" signal was issued. The preplaned signal was a launch-on-time
requirement to determine a time interval to reset the computer for a new launch
window. The time interval to accomplish this task was 15 minutes. Prior to
resuming the count, a power fluctuation was detected from power supply 3. The
hold was extended, and the difficulty was traced to a faulty safety switch. The
switch was bypassed, and the test proceeded normally with T - 0 occurring at
1618 EST. Other than the hold at T - 5 minutes for guidance system launch on
time and the power supply, the test was completed with satisfactory results.
Composite Readiness Test
The composite readiness test (CRT, r,ef. 3) was conducted to revalidate and
verify the proper operation of the vehicle and G-SE electrical systems. This
test for AC-5 was conducted on February 25. Prior to conducting the test, guid-
ance system 19A was removed from the vehicle for a clock pulse generator board
change. Accelerometer pulse count shifts due to the board change resulted in
the system becoming unacceptable for flight and the backup system 26 became
the flight item. The test began at 1235 EST and was completed satisfactorily.
Payload
The 1400-pound Surveyor dynamic model arrived at ETR on January 22. En-
capsulation of the dynamic model within the flight nose fairing was accom-
plished on February 3 and then mated to the launch vehicle on February 5. The
encapsulated payload was demated on February 19 following quad tanking and FACT
for final flight preparations. The encapsulated payload was remated to the
launch vehicle on February 26 in preparation for launch on March 2.
Launch
The Atlas-Centaur launch vehicle AC-5, consisting of Centaur 6C and Atlas
156D, was launched from ETR Complex 36A at 0825:04 EST on March 2. The launch
ended in destruction of the vehicle approximately 3 seconds after 2-inch motion.
The failure was caused by the loss of booster engine thrust, which was attrib-
uted to fuel starvation of the booster engines.
Weather
The atmospheric conditions on launch day were favorable. All wind veloci-
ties (fig. III-l) were within vehicle specification, and the conditions for pho-
tographic -coverage were excellent.
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Time
Surface temperature
Relative humidity
Surface winds
Visibility
Cloud coverage
0825 EST
68° P
92 percent
14 knots at 175° true North
10 miles
JsO percent strato-cumulus base at 4000 ft
KLO percent alto-cumulus base at 16 000 ft
'AC-5 Prelaunch History - 1965
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I/A erection
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FACT
Demate payload
CRT
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Launch
January 7
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January 29
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February 5
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February 25
February 26
March 2
15
100
80
03
= *
40
20
0
1U
Wind fro
< >^
m soi
/
/
\
^^
th
V
<<
J
/<C
<^
^
\
\
Wind
north
N
"\>
i •
— -vs
'^
from
Preflight model
Measured wind
1 1 I—
Wind from west
40 -200 -160 -120
Wind velocity, ft/sec
-40
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Figure III-l. - Wind conditions measured prior to AC-5 launch as determined by Rawinsonde run
at 0824 EST on March 2, 1965 (preflight data).
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IV. LAUNCH ON TIME
The AC-5 launch demonstrated two important launch-on-time objectives essen-
tial to the development of a capability to adjust to unknown factors that could
cause the miss of a launch window. These factors were (l) to demonstrate the
capability to preplan a countdown operation and execute the countdown to achieve
a precise vehicle lift-off time and (2} to demonstrate the ability of the launch
vehicle to hold for a preplanned length of time in a fully tanked condition
without systems degradation.
The Atlas-Centaur AC-5 launch vehicle was launched on March 2, 1965, at
0825:04 EST, which was 4 seconds after the window opening time. Although
shortly after lift-off the vehicle failed, the launch countdown was successful
thus demonstrating the ability to launch on time.
The launch window for AC-5 was derived from the actual launch window of
October 10, 1964. The window opening was established at 0825 EST and was biased
by 7 hours to provide maximum launch opportunity and to permit range photo-
graphic coverage.
The Range countdown was scheduled for 280 minutes with preplanned holds
of 60 and 40 minutes at T - 90 and T - 5 minutes, respectively. These hold
times were planned into the countdown to increase the launch-on-time capability.
The countdown began at 0205 EST and continued without a hold until T - 90
minutes. At T - 140 minutes, the complex, encountered a facility power failure
that caused the guidance-autopilot test start time to be delayed 40 minutes.
The preplanned hold of 60 minutes absorbed this 40 minutes thus allowing the
countdown to proceed on schedule upon resuming the count at T - 90 minutes. The
countdown continued without a hold until T - 5 minutes, at which time the
40-minute hold was started. The only anomaly at this time was that the Centaur
LOX topping extended into the hold period by 2 minutes to complete topping to
100 percent. The 40-minute hold demonstrated the ability of the Atlas-Centaur
vehicle to hold for a preplanned length of time in a fully tanked condition
without apparent systems degradation.
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V. ATLAS PROPULSION SYSTEM
Summary
The Atlas propulsion system operated normally through lift-off for the
AC-5 launch. At approximately 1.0 second (all times are referenced to vehicle
lift-off) the "booster engines began losing thrust as a result of fuel depletion
to the turbopump inlets. The loss of thrust resulted in the vehicle settling
"back on the launch pad at 2.8 seconds. Several possibilities exist as to the
cause of fuel depletion, although closure of the fuel prevalve and the staging
valve are considered the primary suspects. Although the exact cause of the-
failure has not been ascertained, comprehensive corrective actions taken for :
future vehicles are such that all known AC-5 failure modes have been eliminated.
System Description and Performance
The Atlas propulsion system consists of two booster, one sustainer, and two
vernier engines. (See system schematic in fig. V-l.) At engine start, the pro-
pellants are supplied from a LOX and a fuel start tank, each pressurized to ap-
proximately 600 psia. . One gas generator drives the sustainer turbopump and
another drives the two booster turbopumps. When the turbopumps approach their
normal operating speeds, the systems revert to the main propellant supply con-
sisting of a LOX tank pressurized to approximately 40 psia and a fuel tank pres-
surized to approximately 73 psia (ref. 5).
The fuel system from the main supply tank to the engine injector contains
a prevalve, a staging valve and disconnect, a turbopump, and a main fuel valve
for the booster system. The sustainer system has. a prevalve, a turbopump, and
a propellant utilization (PU) valve. The LOX system has the same elements ex-
cept that the main LOX valve replaces the main fuel valve for the boosters, and
a head supression valve replaces the PU valve for the sustainer.
All Atlas propulsion system parameters were normal through lift-off.for
the AC-5 launch. Table V-I compares some propulsion system nominal values with
those obtained; at lift-off on AC-5. The first indication of trouble occurred
with the loss of fuel pump-inlet pressure (FPIP). From 0.7 to 0.9 second the
B-l FPIP decayed from 56.0 to 5.5 psia, and the B-2 FPIP from 56.0 to 8.0 psia
(fig. V-2). Following 1.1 seconds the inlet pressures for both the B-l and B-2
sides remained below 3.0 psia. The fuel tank ullage pressure remained essen-
tially constant until vehicle disintegration at 2.8 seconds, indicating the
source of the problem was somewhere between the main fuel supply and the turbo-
pump inlets. The B-l and B-2 thrust chamber pressures (fig. V-3).were 560 psia
at 0.8 second. At 1.1 seconds, the B-l pressure was 487 psia and the B-2 was
530 psia. By 1.5 seconds both chamber pressures had decayed to approximately
40 psia. The sustainer chamber pressure remained normal, approximately 700 psia,
until flight termination.
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The booster gas generator chamber pressure (fig. • V-4) was 515 psia at
1.0 second and decayed to 30 psia by 1.5 seconds. The gas generator should have
reverted to start tank operation but did not. For gas generator operation the
gas generator blade valve is in the open position. Hardware recovery indicated
the blade valve was in the closed position. Two theories have been advanced as
to why the blade valve closed. One states that following the loss of fuel at
the turbopump inlets, the ducts collapsed severing the electrical connection to
the blade valve solenoid control. The other states that the overspeeding of the
turbopumps loosened the electrical connections. In either case, the closure of
the gas generator blade valve is considered a result of the vehicle failure.
The B-l turbopump started to overspeed from its normal speed of 6350 rpm at
0.8 second (see fig. V-5). The B-2 turbopump started to overspeed at 0.95 sec-
ond with a value of 6150 rpm, reached a peak value of 6850 rpm at 1.1 seconds,
and decayed to 1500 rpm by 2.7 seconds. The turbopumps initially oversped be-
cause the loss of fuel unloaded the system. The only discrepancies in the sus-
tainer system and the booster LOX system performance (fig. V-6) are considered
a result of the vehicle failure.
- . The length of time the thrust chambers could operate under steady-state
conditions following the loss of fuel at the turbopump inlets was calculated
to be about 0.25 second. With the sequence of events occurring in the order
described and from the study of flight films, starvation of fuel to the turbo-
pump inlets has been concluded as the AC-5 failure mode.
Failure Analysis
Fuel starvation to the booster engines could have been caused by the fol-
lowing possible failure modes (ref. 6):
(1) Closure of the prevalve
(2) Closure of the staging valve
(3) Low pressure ducting rupture
(4) Blockage of the low pressure ducts
(5) Fill and drain valve remaining open
(6) Generation of, and reaction to, a BECO signal
A schematic describing the critical area between the main fuel supply and
the-turbopump inlets is shown in figure V-7. Figures V-8 to 11 show the pre-
valve assembly, the prevalve actuator and crank arms, the butterfly valve, and
the "spider" in the staging disconnect, respectively.
Prevalve. - Examination of hardware after the fire indicated that the pre-
valve actuator was unlocked and the butterfly valve was near the closed posi-
tion. Evaluation of data revealed there was no command given to close the pre-
valve. Flow tests indicated the maximum torque that fuel flow can exert on the
butterfly valve was approximately 260 inch-pounds. With the prevalve in the
locked open position the minimum torque required to cause system failure was de-
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termined to be approximately 2000 inch-pounds. Additional tests indicated that
it was possible to actuate-the prevalve toward the open position, have the mi-
croswitches indicate the prevalve open, and not have the actuator in the locked
open position. The flow tests also indicated that if the prevalve was greater
than 4° from the full open position, the valve would slam shut in approximately
0.8 second. If this were the case for AC-5, the prevalve would have shut prior
to lift-off.
If the prevalve failed on AC-5, it did not fail in the locked open posi-
tion. The valve was either locked and became unlocked prior to failure, or was
partially open but unlocked.
The AC-5 prevalve actuator was recovered, disassembled, and examined for
failure analysis. Testing and examination of-the components were compared with
failure history reports on other actuators. The only significant anomaly was
the presence of a foreign fluid behind the actuator piston. The fluid was ana-
lyzed and found to be a mixture of RP-1 fuel and "firex" water. Firex water
was used to quench the flames after vehicle impact. The fluid is assumed to
have entered the actuator following vehicle destruction.
Although the variation of closure time from actuator to actuator often can
be considerable, the times for one particular actuator are usually consistent.
The AC-5 actuator required 2.1 seconds to close during quad tanking and only .re-
quired 0.9 second to close on X - 2 days. Both values are within specifica-
tions; however, the significant time reduction on X - 2 could have indicated
that the actuator was not locked open. This also opens the possibility that the
actuator was not locked open on launch day (unpublished GD/C data).
Possibilities of the prevalve closing are that some shock, pneumatic surge,
or false electrical signal to the pneumatic ground control was sufficient to
drive the valve closed. Tests and analysis have been conducted on the following
to determine if a sufficient shock or surge existed on AC-5:
(1) Evaluate pressure pulses resulting from the unique configuration of the
launcher flame buckets on Complex 36A combined with the effect of 165k booster
engines. This was the first Atlas-Centaur launch using 165k boosters.
(2) Analyze launcher deflections for vehicle AC-5 and launch pad 36A. De-
termine spring and unloading effect of launcher on vehicle.
(3) Determine the possible effect of overpressurization of the launcher
pneumatic system.
(.4) Investigate electrical power transients to determine the effect on the
prevalve electrical system.
(5) Install pneumatic purge box accelerometer instrumentation on a future
Atlas, vehicle flight. Evaluate data to determine the vibration1levels in this
area.
(6) Determine force necessary to separate a frozen rise off disconnect
panel and the force necessary under normal separation.
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(7) Evaluate the possibility of high pressure not venting from the
pneumatic system at lift-off.
Analysis of the preceding areas have revealed no source considered adequate
to drive the fuel prevalve from the locked open, to the closed position.
Staging valve. - A schematic drawing of the staging valve and disconnect is
shown in figure V-12. The main components of the valve are the housing, the
spring loaded poppet, and the valve seat. The disconnect contains a "spider"
member that supports the staging valve poppet through booster engine operation.
The nominal dimension between the flange of the staging valve and the flange of
the staging disconnect is 17.5±0.2 inches (see fig. V-12). ' This results in a
nominal longitudinal separation of 1.5±0.2 inches between the poppet and its
seat. At booster engine cutoff (BECO) the booster section of the Atlas sepa-
rates from the remainder of the vehicle. At this time the staging disconnect
pulls away from the poppet and the spring drives the poppet to its seat, ter-
minating flow to the booster engines.
Closure of the staging valve can be accomplished by buckling of the spider
member, buckling of the staging disconnect, failure of the main support, dis-
placement of the booster structure, or combinations of these (see fig. V-12).
Results of unpublished GD/C analysis have eliminated displacement of the booster
structure alone as a possible failure mode. Investigations have been conducted
to evaluate the remaining failure modes.
Flow tests have been performed to determine the load produced by the poppet
on the spider at different settings of clearance between the poppet and its seat
for a range of flow rates. Figure V-13 summarizes the results of this test.
The figure demonstrates that the maximum allowable setting is in an area where
a rapid change in poppet load results from a small increase in valve setting.
The load increases sharply as a result of the effect of the poppet blocking the
flow stream. At a flange-to-flange separation of 17.87 inches, the member began
to yield; at a separation of 18.10 inches, the spider member and the staging
disconnect housing buckled before rated flow was obtained. The buckled hardware
was similar in appearance to that recovered following AC-5.
From the foregoing investigation it was concluded that an allowable flange-
to-flange valve setting of up to 17.7 inches could be dangerous - particularly
on the AC-5 launch where an abnormally high longitudinal vibration (see Sec-
tion XI. VEHICLE DYNAMICS) may have resulted in catastrophic loading on the
staging valve poppet.
Static load tests were conducted to determine the strength and deflection
of the spider and of the staging disconnect. Figure V-13 also contains a plot
of spider deflection as a function of load. The deflection of these members
during operation .would allow the poppet to near the seat and thus increase the
poppet load exerted by flow. The spider member buckled at 2700 pounds of load,
and the staging disconnect buckled at 6500 pounds. Although the static tests
revealed the staging disconnect to be considerably stronger than the spider mem-
ber, both members buckled during the flow tests. The staging disconnect could
have buckled with the lower loads as the result of an eccentric loading follow-
ing the buckling of the spider member.
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During the AC-5 tanking test, fuel was drained from the main propellent
tank by opening the prevalve and allowing the propellant to. surge into the low
pressure ducting. It was feared that the load created "by the fuel may have been
sufficient to overstress the main support strut shown in figure V-12. The
yielding of this strut could then have "been sufficient to allow the staging '
disconnect to move and the poppet to seat, thus terminating fuel flow to the
engine. A test has "been run duplicating the conditions on AC-5, however, and
indicated that the force was well below the 18 000 pounds necessary to cause
the support to yield. . . . .
Duct failure and fill and.drain. - The low pressure ducting to the booster
engines was recovered in the collapsed-condition. Both the B-l and B-2 fuel
pump inlet pressures were maintained at less than 3.0 psia from
1.1 seconds until termination of flight. The pressure differential between the
atmosphere and the ducting was more than adequate to cause the ducts to col-
lapse. Analysis shows a critical buckling differential of 5.5 psi.. However,
the fact that the ducts were able to maintain vacuum condition until flight
termination indicates that the system remained intact. This eliminates duct
rupture and an open fuel fill and drain valve as AC-5 failure modes. • . .
Duct blockage. - Hardware inspection of the pertinent areas uncovered no
obstruction considered adequate to block fuel flow. It is highly doubtful that
a foreign object could have so completely terminated flow as to result in the
rapid pressure decay indicated in figure V-2.
False BECO. - A review of the flight films and analysis of. data have re-
vealed no thrust section explosion and'no generation of a false BECO signal. No
incorrect electrical or pneumatic connections have been discovered.
Corrective Action • .
Loss of the AC-5 vehicle soon after lift-off, the ensuing failure analysis,
and associated test programs resulted in isolating the cause of the catastrophe
to fuel starvation of the booster engines. A study of the fuel system indicated
that malfunction of the prevalve pneumatic remote control actuators or the stag-
ing valve and disconnect could have, caused fuel starvation of the engines.
Hardware and procedural changes to future vehicles are detailed below.
Booster prevalve actuation. - Of all the possible failure modes considered,
none has been clearly identified as the prime cause of this malfunction. Since
the Atlas vehicle is the booster stage of the Atlas-Agena system, flight sched-
ules dictated an interim modification. For the Atlas-Centaur .vehicle it was
decided to eliminate remote control actuation and revert to manual operation and
locking of the prevalve. The various modifications are detailed in the follow-
ing .paragraphs.
In order to avoid impacting Atlas-Agena missions, an interim fix was de-
cided on. This modification consists of attaching a wedge to the actuator
housing that physically holds the prevalve in the open position. The installa-
tion details of the wedge are shown in figure V-14. The wedge' is installed dur-
ing countdown after requirements for remote pneumatic power operation have been
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fulfilled. All pneumatic lines are disconnected at this time. From figure V-14
it can be seen that, with the torque induced "by fuel flow, loads on the prevalve
butterfly try to turn the bell-crank in the direction indicated. To accom-
plish this motion the actuator must pivot about the trunion. The rotation about
the trunion is prevented by the presence of the wedge.
Permanent fix: Design of a permanent modification of the prevalve actuator
for the Atlas-Centaur consisted of substituting a manual handle on the butterfly
shaft to replace the pneumatic actuator. The manual handle has the capability
of being locked in the prevalve open and .closed positions by two bolts either of
which is capable of reacting fuel flow loads induced by the prevalve butterfly.
Figure V-15 shows the details of this modification. In order to obviate
similar failure of the sustainer fuel prevalve, remote pneumatic actuation on
this valve was also deleted. This was replaced by an Atlas series "E" manually
operated prevalve. An improved locking device is to be incorporated to assure
positive locking in the open position by means of a clamping bracket. This de-
vice is illustrated in figure V-16. To establish the load-carrying capa-
bility of the various elements of the prevalve system, a static load test was
accomplished. The results of this test are shown in figure V-17. The load was
applied to the butterfly shaft with a moment arm of 24 inches, subjecting the
shaft to a static torque. This torsion was transmitted to
(1) The AC-5 actuator, which was in the prevalve open mode, and
(2) The manual actuator design to be used on AC-6 and on vehicles, also in
the prevalve open mode
In the first case, failure of the bell-crank occurred at a torque of 2064 inch- '.
pounds, establishing the weakest element of the system. Since the bell-crank is
deleted in the modification, it was established that the system is capable of at
least reaching a, torque of over 2064 inch-pounds. The manual actuation design
(aluminum handle) showed no failure at a torque value of 4320 inch-pounds. This
compares with'a maximum value of 260 inch-pounds of torque induced by fuel flow
based on a flow rate for 165k booster engines.
Thrust section access door: This modification provides for convenient
access for manual operation of the prevalves. It consists of an 8- by 6-inch
door cut in the thrust section, opposite the location of the prevalves. The
effectivity of this modification is Atlas 194D (AC-9) vehicle. It was decided
not to incorporate this modification on the next flight vehicle (AC-6) because
of the associated schedule impact.
Procedure: As a result of the deletion of fuel prevalve actuator, the
countdown procedure has been modified by dropping those items in the sequence
associated with the remote actuation of the prevalve.
Booster staging valve. - To preclude excessive loading on the poppet valve
and spider on the AC-6 vehicle, it has been decided to decrease the nominal
valve setting dimension from 17.5 to 17.25 inches; thus moving to the left of
the poppet loading curve shown in figure V-13. This decrease in the valve set-
ting is to be accomplished by introducing a 0.25-inch shim between the aft
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flange of the staging disconnect and the forward flange of the downstream fuel
ducting.
In order to confirm the position of the poppet in relation to its seat on
the flight vehicle, it has been decided to X-ray the installation. On the AC-6
vehicle, this will "be done on the launch pad.
. Booster fuel system low pressure ducting. - Unusual loads induced in the
"booster low pressure ducting during the tanking test are suspected of having
veakened the support structure sufficiently to have caused AC-5 failure. The
sequence of events that led to the suspected over-stressing were:
(1) Closure of the fuel prevalve
(2) Draining of fuel from the low pressure ducting through the fill and
drain valve (This resulted in a partial vacuum in the ducting noted •
during the tanking test.)
(3) Opening of the prevalve permitting fuel to rush into the ducting under
existing partial vacuum conditions .
The on-rush of fuel may have created a transient dynamic load condition
that overstressed the ducting and support structure. Flow tests duplicating
the preceding, conditions show that induced loads are quite low and well within
the capability of the support structure and ducting. However, it has "been
decided to eliminate this source of load on future vehicles. This will be
accomplished "by avoiding the sequence of events previously detailed. Test site
personnel have been instructed accordingly. '
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TABLE V-I. - COMPABISON OF PREDICTED AND CALCULATED ATLAS SYSTEM
PROPULSION VALUES AT LIFT-OFF
Parameter
Booster thrust .
' Sustainer thrust
Vernier thrust
Total thrust
Booster specific impulse
Sustainer (plus vernier) specific impulse
' (B-1 chamber pressure
B-2 chamber pressure
' Sustainer chamber pressure
B-1 FPIP
1
 B-2 FPIP
Sustainer FPIP
•B-1 pump speed
B-2 pump speed
Sustainer pump speed
Booster gas generator chamber pressure
Sustainer gas generator discharge pressure
B-1 LOX pump inlet pressure
B-2 LOX pump inlet pressure
Sustainer LOX pump inlet pressure
Units
Ib force
Ib force
Ib force
Ib force
Ib force- sec
Ib mass
Ib force-sec
Ib mass
psia
psia
psia
psia
psia
psia >
rpm
rpm
rpm
psia
psia
psia
psia
psia
Calculated
or data
value at
lift-off
324 220
56 260
1 720
382 460
252.1
213.4
565
568
715
61.5
64.0
69.0
638
612
1 012
525
575
52.0
52.0
59.0
Predicted
or
nominal
value
326 190
56 240
1 710
384 140
252. o;
211. 6
580
575
706
69.9
69.9
72.0
6 306
6 256
10 098
526
No data
54.0
54.0,
58.6
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Figure V-1. - Propulsion system schematic.
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Figure V-7. - Fuel system low pressure ducting configuration between main fuel supply and turbo-
pump inlets.
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Figure V-8. - Booster fuel prevalve assembly. (Disk in upper left portion of figure in-
stalled for testing purposes only).
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Figure V-9. - Recovered AC-5 actuator and crank arm
assembly. (Actuator in the open position).
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Figure V-10. - Recovered AC-5 booster fuel prevalve. View looking into booster fuel
prevalve (still assembled to staging valve) showing butterfly position.
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'
Figure V-ll. - Rear view of recovered staging disconnect showing spider still intact.
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Figure V-12. - Schematic drawing of Atlas Fuel staging valve and staging disconnect.
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VI. ATLAS SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE
Other than the propulsion system, all the Atlas systems functioned normally
from their prelaunch condition to vehicle failure. The hydraulic system main-
tained proper pressure level until T + 2. 8 seconds at which time the vehicle was
:in a general state of disintegration. The electrical and telemetry system oper-
ation was satisfactory and within specification. The flight control system
maintained vehicle stability throughout. The pitch, yaw, and roll displace-
ments were all less than 0. 7° from their lift-off values. The tank pressuriza-
tion program resulting from introduction of 165k engines was satisfactorily
accomplished by the pneumatic system. A return to LOX tank full flight pres-
sures could" not be demonstrated because of early loss of the vehicle.
• .
 ;
 • ; " . Atlas Hydraulic System
The .booster and sustainer hydraulic systems are totally independent and are
powered by two variable-displacement pressure-compensated pumps. The two .hy-
draulic pumps are driven by the sustainer and B-2 turbopumps with each system
delivering-3000 psi for engine gimbal requirements during flight.
. 'Prior to main engine start and the associated hydraulic power changeover,
;the two systems are supplied by a ground unit at 2000 psi. The changeover from
2000 to.3000 psi at main engine start is sensed by airborne instrumentation and
is a launch release ladder requirement.
Booster and sustainer hydraulic systems reacted normally through the start
transient and on to T + 2.8 seconds (see fig. VI-l). Power changeover from
ground to airborne pressures started at.T - 2 seconds and was complete at
T - 1.5 seconds. The ground pressures reflected to the airborne transducers
were 1900 psi for the booster and 1950 psi for the sustainer. The pressures
after main engine start were 3000 psi on the booster and sustainer systems ex-
cept for the normal pressure transients expected at start and after vehicle
;lift-off. Loss of pressure occurred at T + 2.8 seconds, sometime during vehicle
disintegration. The system functioned normally throughout, and no anomalies
were noted.
Atlas Electrical and Instrumentation System
Atlas electrical power system. - The booster electrical power sources, dis
tribution, and transfer systems operated satisfactorily. All electrical func-
tions and levels were within specifications and adequately supported the flight
from countdown to vehicle destruct. The a-c power was supplied by a 400-cycle
3-phase 115-volt rotary inverter. This was the first Atlas launch vehicle to
use a manually activated battery, and the first Centaur booster to use a 19-cell
battery.
The booster vehicle battery voltage exhibited a voltage transient drop on
power changeover. The voltage reached a minimum value of 26. 3 volts. The
steady-state voltage was 27. 9 volts and remained constant- The minimum allow-
able battery voltage was 26.5 volts.
Figure VT-2 illustrates the inverter frequency and voltage and the missile
system d-c input. The inverter frequency after initial dip to 399.5 cps at
power changeover remained constant at 402.1 cps. The inverter voltage remained
constant at 115.4 volts from power changeover until vehicle destruct.
The booster vehicle electrical system schematic is shown in figure VT-3.
Atlas telemetry and instrumentation system. - One telemetry radiofrequency
link was established to telemeter 109 Atlas measurements and three angle-of-
attack measurements. The telemetry package provided between 4 and 10 watts to
dual antennas. Minimum radiated power requirements from the two antennas are
1 watt from pod 1 antenna and 0.8 watt from pod 2 antenna. Prelaunch measure-
ments indicated 2.5 and 1.9 watts for pod 1 and pod 2 antennas, respectively.
Telemetry and instrumentation system performance was satisfactory. Signal
strength was adequate and no transducer failures were reported.
Atlas range safety command system. - Dual receivers were used on the AC-5
boost vehicle. Normal operation of receiver 1 was confirmed by the receiver
automatic gain control (AGC) measurement (AD TV). Figure VI-2(c) shows the
receiver AGC level at 45T microvolts prior to lift-off and increasing to
833 microvolts at T + 2 seconds. Minimum required AGC level for command de-
struct is 5 microvolts. Receiver 2 AGC was not telemetered.
Atlas Pneumatic System
Operation of the airborne pneumatic system was satisfactory. All pres->
surization and control functions were properly performed during the countdown
and powered flight.
Tank pressures. - LOX and fuel tank ullage pressures were satisfactorily
maintained by the airborne pneumatic system subsequent to changeover from the
ground pressurization unit. The programed pressurization system for the VOX
tank demonstrated proper operation through to vehicle destruction; this system
was programed to terminate at T + 20 seconds. A transient minimum pressure dif-
ference across the intermediate bulkhead of 11.9 psid was recorded 1/2 second
after lift-off.
Controls pressurization. - The controls and staging bottles were adequately
pressurized to .support pneumatic control functions. No further evaluation of
this system can be conducted because of vehicle destruction.
Helium storage. - The liquid-nitrogen - helium loading system ground
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equipment operated satisfactorily by loading helium aboard the vehicle to the
prescribed pressure and chilling it to the required temperature.
Atlas Flight Control System
Telemetry indicated no unusual vehicle transients or shocks as observed
from rate and displacement gyro data prior to the loss of booster thrust. The
operation of the Atlas flight control system was normal.
Flight control system telemetry data received is shown in figures VI-4
.to 8. Rate gyro data (fig. VI-4) show normal characteristics during the thrust
build-up period. Prior to the loss of booster thrust, vehicle lift-off was
typical of previous Atlas-Centaur launches. A lift-off roll transient started
at 0.92 second resulting in a maximum roll rate of 2.0 degrees per secdnd
(fig. VI-4) at T + 1.1 seconds and a maximum roll displacement of 0.5 degree
(fig. VI-5) at T + 1.3 seconds. On the recovery maneuver, the roll rate reached
2.5 degrees per second. A large roll rate overshoot occurred at T + 1.27
seconds and probably was caused by the decaying of booster thrust. At this
time booster thrust was less than 10 percent of its nominal value when the
peak roll rate was reached.
Autopilot activation occurred at approximately T + 0.9 second (42-in. mo-
tion). Engine displacements shown in figures VI-6 to 8 demonstrated proper
response to the respective rate and displacement gyro outputs. Figure VI-9
shows the polarity conventions defining positive directions of pitch,, yaw, and /
roll. . Booster, sustainer, and vernier engine deflections are shown as negative
in figures VI-6 to 8, when correcting for positive pitch, yaw, or roll disper-
sions. ' • '
The loss of booster thrust left the vehicle with no yaw control, but only
vernier pitch/roll control. Vehicle attitude errors prior to the time the ve-
hicle returned to its initial lift-off position, as indicated by displacement
gyro outputs, were 0.7 degree in pitch, 0.4 degree in yaw, and 0.2 degree
in roll at T + 2.77 seconds.
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VII. GUIDANCE
* Summary
Investigations after the aborted AG-5 launch have disclosed that, in addi-
tion to the Atlas propellent feed system failure, a serious malfunction also
occurred in the power control circuitry of the navigation computer unit of the
missile guidance set. The failure- resulted in the computer going to essentially
a nonoperative mode at lift-off. The computer malfunction was in no way related
to the Atlas propulsion problem. An interim configuration for the computer has
been established for use on AC-6 and AC-7 that eliminates unused parts, thor-
oughly tests the power control circuitry, and eliminates redundant voltage
carrying leads from the computer, through the umbilical connector, to GSE. A
final configuration for AC-8 and later flights has been established, which,
additionally, simplifies the power control circuitry by reducing the number of
relays from ten to three.
AC-5 Guidance . Analysis
Malfunction analysis. - Postlaunch analysis of the telemetered digital
data word (DDW) showed that the DDW assumed a neutral state (corresponding
to a nominal 2.5-V level) and hence was conveying no information. This was
the only indication of a possible malfunction within the missile guidance set
(MGS). The DDW recording was compared with other recordings to determine if
there was a malfunction and to isolate or pin point the probable cause of the
malfunction. The DDW is generated in the navigation computer unit (hereinafter
called the computer) of the MGS and then modulates a telemetry pack that tele-
meters the information from the vehicle. The information conveyed by the DDW
is a function of the input information to the computer and the computer itself.
Prior to umbilical ejection the same DDW is transmitted on a landline to the
launch control facility.
Trace (a) of figure VII-1 shows the computer digital data word (DDW)
from several seconds before the switch of guidance to inertia! mode, at
T - 7.868 seconds, until vehicle breakup. The interruption at T -7.868 sec-
onds normally occurs when the system is switched into the inertia! mode; how-
ever, at T - 1.292 seconds a complete loss of the telemetered digital data word
(DDW) occurred. After loss of the digital data word the telemetry signal volt-
age level was 2.5 volts, which indicates that the wire to the telemetry trans-
mitter was intact, and the computer was supplying 2.5 volts bias. Later bit-by-
bit examination of the DDW showed that, up until the time of data loss, the
computer Vas operating normally.
Trace (b) of figure VII-1 shows .the main missile battery current. Two ob-
vious transients are visible. At the time of DDW loss, the current dropped from
about 53.8 to 46.3 amperes (7. 5- A change). It is shown later in this report
that the ejection of the J401, J402, J403, and J404 Centaur umbilical plugs also
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occurred at approximately this time. The second transient is a drop in current
from 46.3 to about 39.5 amperes. It has been.determined that this drop occurred
at the time of ejection of the J412 umbilical plug, and can be attributed to
cutoff of the hydraulic circulating pumps that normally occurs at this time.
During FACT plugs out test, the measured current on AC-5 after J412 ejection was
measured as 46.5 amperes with telemetry and 46 amperes on the landlines. This
value of 46 amperes is also typical of values measured on other vehicles.
Therefore, the 39.5 amperes for the AC-5 flight is about 7 amperes below normal,
and this corresponds, with expected accuracy, to the current drop that occurred
when the J401, J402, J403, and J404 umbilical plugs were pulled.
Traces (c). and (d) of figure VII-1 show that the 35- and 22. 2-volt d-c
guidance power supplies are normal throughout this entire sequence of events.
In trace (a) of figure VII-2 the DIM is again shown for reference with
other guidance signals. Trace (b), the 14.4-kilocycle accelerometer demodula-
tor output, shows effects of vibration at engine ignition and is normal until
loss of data. Traces (c) and (d), the Wr-accelerometer delta "V" and the W-gyro
7. 2-kilocycle demodulator outputs, show proper operation of the guidance accel-
erometer and gimbal control loops until loss of data.
Figure VII-3, traces (b) to (d), the U-, V-, and V-gyro torquing traces,
show normal changes at transfer to inertia! mode, and little activity from then
until loss of meaningful data. To check computer operation further after loss
of DDW, the gyro torquing traces were examined in greater detail. If the com-
puter had lost power, no changes in the gyro torquing should occur. Telemetered
delta "V's" were used to calculate the W-axis (vertical) acceleration history.
The acceleration values were used with gyro "d" values, and known computer
cycle lags, to calculate the W-gyro torquing profile for the period after lift-
off. The calculated profile is shown, together with the measured torquing, in
figure VTI-4. Although measured torquing shows some variation, the variations
are not time correlated to the calculated profile and are believed to be a re-
sult of telemetry noise. The observed and calculated variations are of the same
order as the known TIM accuracy; therefore the gyro torquing data is considered,
inclusive.
The U-, V-, and W-steering traces ((b) to (d) in fig. VII-5) appear nomi-
nal and stable throughout this interval, excepting changes that were determined
to be decommutator dropout. Examination of the wave train data for this signal
revealed that the trace remained constant throughout the "flight".
In summary of the preceding analysis, guidance system performance appeared
normal until the vehicle broke up, with the exception that DDW was lost at
T - 1.292 seconds. This time corresponded approximately to the time of ejec-
tion of the J401, J402, J403, and J404 plugs; an abnormal drop in battery cur-
rent of about 7.5 amperes occurred at the same time.
Henceforth, in this discussion GMT time shall be used. For reference, loss
of DDW at 1325:02.904 GMT corresponds to T - 1.292 seconds.
Figure VH-6 is a high-speed readout showing DDW, and U-, V-, and W-delta
V's, and main missile battery current. In addition to the loss of DDW at
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1325:02.904 GMT, some distortions of the DDW and delta V waveshapes occurred in
the time period 01 1325:02.884 GMT (T - 1. 312 sec) until 1325:02.887 GIVET. Also
of interest in figure VII-6 is the transient on the DDW trace that occurred
10 milliseconds after the loss of digital data. These anomalies will "be dis-
cussed in a later section of this report.
Malfunction isolation. - Examination of computer schematics and computer
testing established several possible failure modes that could account for the
observed loss in DDW. Among these failure modes are
(1) Grounding of any of the electronics associated with functions K5, K5,
KB, TO flip-flops, or the PQ emitter follower
(2) Failure of the K5 relay, the relay set control, or associated circuitry
(3) Complete loss of 28-volt power to the computer
Of these failure modes, only (2) and (3) would account for the observed drop in
d-c current. Equivalent d-c load currents for systems other than guidance are
as follows:
System Equivalent
d-c current,
A
Autopilot
Propellant utilization
C-band beacon
Range safety command 1
Inverter no-load
H20g heaters
Boost pump heaters
5.1
.8
.9
1.6
12.0
2.4
2.8
All these systems were verified to be operating normally after lift-off, with
the exception that the EgO^ and boost pump heaters were difficult to verify in
the short time before vehicle breakup. However-, these heaters were switched to
internal at power changeover and are thereafter isolated from the umbilicals.
It is therefore concluded that the observed current drop occurred within the
guidance system. Further, since only the computer exhibited any anomalies be-
fore vehicle breakup, it is concluded that the observed current drop is related
.to the loss of computer.power.
Previous testing at ETR has shown that when the computer is switched from
coast phase to run there is approximately a 7-ampere increase in battery cur-
rent; when switched from off to run approximately 9 amperes are required. Test-
ing of a computer at Honeywell has shown that switching from coast phase to run
requires an additional 14 watts of d-c power (0.5 A at 28 V), and an increase
in a-c power of 129 watts (7.1. A dc, assuming 65 percent inverter efficiency).
This gives a total equivalent d-c current of 7.6 amperes. Also, the total
computer requirement (off to run) was about 10 amperes equivalent d-c current.
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Thus the current requirements measured on the computer at Honeywell and those
measured in vehicle testing are in fair agreement. Furthermore, it is apparent
from the observed current change that the computer went essentially to the
coast-phase mode and did not suffer total loss of power (the coast phase power
required is essentially all ac).
Figure VII-7 is a schematic drawing of the computer power control circui-
try. A simplified schematic drawing showing only pertinent details is pre-
sented in figure VII-8. Referring to figure VII-8 in the startup cycle and
applying a 28-volt signal to the warmup line from GSE pulls in relays K6
(400 cps power computer) and K9. The K9 contact closure in turn applies power
to K8. Airborne 28 volts is routed through umbilical plug J404 to the GSE and
back through J404 to a set of contacts on relay K6. When K6 is actuated, this
airborne 28 volts electrically latches K6 and K9 and (through K9 contacts) KB.
When the computer is commanded to run, K5 (a set-reset relay) is put into the
set position. , Airborne 28 volts through K5 contacts provides another path to
latch K6, K9, and KB electrically. If K5 is not in the set position when um-
bilical plug J404 is pulled, the electrical latch on K6, K9; and thus K8 is
lost, and most computer power will be cut off. Power will also be cut off if
airborne 28 volts is lost with the computer in the run condition (even if plug
J404 is engaged). Because the computer output was lost at essentially the time
that'the J404 plug was ejected, the former failure mode is considered by far the
most probable.
Establishment of umbilical eject times. - Because of the apparent relation
between the computer failure and the ejection of Centaur umbilical plugs, it
was necessary to establish precisely the time of ejection of the J404 umbilical
plug. To accomplish this, blockhouse E-A (event recorders) and high-speed re-
cordings of landline data were used. The following table gives the ejection
times of various umbilical plugs as read from these recordings.
Umbilical
J401
.T4.OP
J403
,74.04.
Event recordings,
sec
1325:02.92
n? Q?
02. 915
O? Q?S
High-speed
landline
recordings
02. 8'85
02. 865
Difference
0.035
.050
Since the resolution and response times of the high-speed recordings are much
better than those for the E-A recordings, the high-speed values must be con-
sidered the most precise. Unfortunately there were no continuous high-speed
recordings of data through the J404 plug. However, the E-A data do indicate
that the J404 plug was the last one ejected and that it was ejected approxi-
mately 5 milliseconds after the J401 plug. Thus the.best estimated time for the
J404 plug is 02.885+0.005 seconds, or 02.890 seconds. This value is con-
sidered accurate to a few milliseconds. Photographs of the umbilical ejection
indicated that the order of mechanical ejection was the same as that indicated
by the landline recordings. However, in spite of the high photograph frame
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rate (400 fps), resolution was not sufficient to verify the landline values of
ejection time.
Referring to figure YII-6 shows that the estimated J404 plug ejection time
of 02.890 seconds is about 3 milliseconds after the last waveform distortion
occurred in the DDW and delta "V" traces. Examination of data from the AC-4
flight and the AC-5 FACT (plugs out) revealed that similar waveform distortion
occurred during umbilical ejections. Later testing showed that the distortions
were particularly related to the ejection of the J402 and the J404 plugs. It
is therefore concluded that the J404 umbilical plug was ejected within ±3 milli-
seconds of 1325:02.887 GMT. This is 17 milliseconds "before loss of the tele-
metered digital data word at 1325:02.904. The delay before loss of the DDW may
be accounted for by relay dropout times in the computer power control circuitry.
Special postflight test results. - During the week following the aborted
launch of AC-5, extensive system and computer testing was conducted at Kearfott,
Honeywell, AFETR, LeRC, and GD/C. The following paragraphs summarize the var-
ious test procedures and results.
(1) AFTER testing.
(a) L-30 computer (S/N 3).
K5 disabled to simulate reset condition. Removal of 28 volts
power to simulate umbilical J404 ejection gave the following delay
times:
5 milliseconds until K9 open
8 milliseconds until K8 open
9 milliseconds until loss of DDW
Complete removal of 28 volts gave essentially the same results.
(b) L-31 computer (S/W 017).
K5 not disabled (in set condition). Complete removal of 28 volts
power:
9 milliseconds until K9 open
10.5 milliseconds until K8 open
13.5 milliseconds until loss of DDW
In these tests, DDW sometimes went to the 2.5-volt state.
(2) Honeywell testing.
MGS 10 tests, L-31 computer (S/N 001).
With and without K5 disabled, all tests showed a loss of 400 cps power
(K6 and K9 open) in 8 to 9 milliseconds and loss of DDW in 11 milli-
seconds or less. Telemetry outputs went to 0 and 2.5 volts randomly.
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(3) Kearfott testing. .
L-31 computers, K5 disabled.
DDW loss in all cases occurred in 10 to 14 milliseconds after inter-
ruption of 28 volts power. However, in about 100 tests, the TIM out-
put never went to 2.5 volts, and only once to 5 volts.
(4) GD/C testing.
AC-6 vehicle, MGS 21, L-31 computer (S/N 021).
(a) Simulated umbilical ejection with K5 disabled:
. - .The DDW went to the 2.5-volt.level 14 milliseconds after J404 plug
ejection. After another 10 milliseconds, the DDW went to the 0-
volt level. The vehicle battery current dropped 6 amperes. The
profile of the current drop was very similar to that observed on
AC-5. These results are presented in figure VII-9.
(b) Complete removal of 28 volts dc from the computer:
The profile of the vehicle battery current drop was somewhat
steeper than that obtained with K5 disabled. In figure VII-10
the current profiles from the GD/C tests .are compared with the
profile from AC-5.
(5) LeRC testing.
L-30 computer (S/N 5).
Relay K5 disabled, simulated umbilical ejection:
11 milliseconds until K9 open
11 to 13 milliseconds until loss of DDW
20 milliseconds until K8 open
20 to 21 milliseconds - transient occurs or DDW trace,
which sometimes changed the voltage level of the DDW
trace. Typical oscilloscope traces from these tests
are shown in figure ¥11-11. ~
These special postflight tests have shown
(1) Loss of DDW in from 10 to 14 milliseconds after simulated umbilical
ejection (K5 disabled), or after complete removal of 28 volts from the
computer. The time delay varies from computer to computer and re-
flects the difference in relay dropout times. Loss of DDW occurs -just
after relay K9 opens. At loss, the DDW may go to the 5-, 2.5-, or
0-volt state.
(2) When 28 volts are completely removed, relays K8 and K9 open at about
the same time.
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(3) When K5 is disabled and umbilical ejection is simulated, K8 opens on
the order of. 10 milliseconds after K9. Opening of K8 results in a
transient on the DDW channel which may or may not change the state of
the DDW flip-flops (output voltage). A similar transient was observed
in the AC-5 flight data 10 milliseconds after loss of DDW (see fig.
VII-5).
(4) The AC-6 vehicle tests, with K5 disabled, showed a missile battery cur-
rent profile closely duplicating that observed on AC-5. When 28 volts
were completely removed from the computer, the current drop was some-
what steeper.
In view of the aforementioned results it is concluded that a failure most
likely occurred in the K5 relay, or its associated circuitry, so that it was
effectively in the "reset" condition. When the J404 umbilical plug was ejected,
GSE 28 volts were removed from relays K6 and K9. Opening of these relays, and
subsequently of the K8 relay, removed power from the arithmetic section of the
computer (essentially the coast-phase mode). Another, but less likely failure,
could have been the loss of 28 volts of power to the computer.
Preflight testing. - Investigation has disclosed that approximately 1 year
ago, when the computer coast-phase circuitry was disabled, all tests that would
check the operation of K5 set control at the unit level were eliminated. The
only known test that checks the operation of this relay is the vehicle system
plugs out test. The computer installed in AC-5 was replaced after FACT plugs
out test, and insofar as can be determined, operation of K5 was never tested.
Since one possible failure mode is the loss of 28 volts of power to the
computer, the wiring harness history was investigated. On F - 1 day, an open
connection was discovered in the harnessing to the platform electronics unit.
Two additional wires in this harness failed during subsequent pull testing. The
PE harness connectors were "Poke-Home" type, and the same type connectors are
used in the computer harnessing. Visual tests were performed on computer con-
nectors; however, pull tests were not run. Microscopic inspection of the failed
pins indicated that faulty crimping tools were probably used.
Concluding Remarks
(1) The computer went into a state similar to "coast phase" (power removed
from the arithmetic section of the computer) resulting in loss of the digital
data at 1325:02.904 GMT (T - 1.290 sec).
(2) Most likely the cause was failure of the K5 relay, or its associated
circuitry. This resulted in the loss of 28 volts of power to hold in relays
KB, K9, and subsequently K8 when the J4Q4 umbilical plug was ejected. Opening
of these relays removed power from the arithmetic section of the computer.
Evidence substantiating this failure mode includes
(a) Time of loss of the DDW after ejection of the J404 plug agrees
with test results to within the knowledge of J404 ejection time
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("fa) Magnitude of the main missile battery current drop
(c) Shape of the current drop profile
(d) Occurrence of a transient on the DDW channel about 8 milliseconds
after loss of digital information; this transient indicates se-
quential opening of relays K9 and KB
(e) Computer and guidance system test procedures, did not adequately
test the operation of relay K5
Corrective action. -
(l) The following action is underway .for AC-6 and AC-7 effectivity:
(a) Remove from the computer or completely isolate e'lectrically all
circuitry which is no longer required.
(b) Modify computer power control GSE so that proper operation of all
airborne computer power control relays and wiring can be verified
before lift-off. This modification will remove power lines that
went directly from the computer to GSE through the umbilical con-
nector which paralleled power lines to the computer from the MGS.
(c) Test operation of K5 on the unit level.
(d) Change PQ emitter follower circuit to relieve wattage overstress
on a resistor.
- (e) Review all other guidance and autopilot Atlas-Centaur GSE inter-
faces, to check for "sneak paths" and other potential failure
modes.
(f) Review computer test procedures for adequacy.
(.2) Additional action, effectivity AC-8: Redesign computer airborne and
GSE power control circuitry. This redesign will simplify power control relays
and circuitry not absolutely required by using three relays in place of ten.
This is possible because of elimination of the coast-phase requirement. Power
control relays will be used in a failsafe mode (not energized during flight).
(3) Airborne harnessing fabrication techniques have been reviewed. Use of
approved wire stripping tools and properly calibrated crimping tools will be
ensured. . .
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Figure Vll-7. - Computer control circuitry.
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. VIII. CENTAUR ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
Summary
The airborne electrical system provides on-board electrical power storage,
conversion, distribution, and protection as well as fulfilling the requirements
of instrumentation, telemetry, tracking, and range safety command systems.
All electrical power systems adequately supported the flight, from count-
down operations to vehicle destruct. The only significant anomaly occurred in
the main missile battery current. A two-step dropin system load was noted that
resulted from dropouts of user systems.
System" power was supplied by a 100-ampere-hour main missile battery, a
100-ampere-hour telemetry battery, and a 650-volt-ampere static inverter. The
pyrotechnic power for the .thrustor bottles, nose-fairing explosive bolts, vent
door, and insulation-panel latches was supplied by two redundant 1/2-ampere-
hour batteries. The range safety command system power was supplied by two bat-
teries identical to the pyrotechnic batteries.
Performance of the Centaur telemetry and instrumentation system was satis-
factory on AC-5. There were 275 measurements of Centaur and the dynamic model
parameters made. The LHg vent pressure measurement was the only one failing to
produce data.
The range safety and tracking systems experienced no anomalies.
Centaur Electrical Power System
Performance of the Centaur electrical power system was satisfactory during
prelaunch operations and until the vehicle was destroyed. A schematic diagram
of the Centaur electrical system is shown in figure VTII-1.
The only significant anomalies in system performance were two step de-
creases in battery current prior'to T - 0 accompanied by a corresponding rise in
main missile battery voltage (fig. VIII-2). The first drop in current occurred
at T - 1.3 seconds and coincided with the loss of the digital data link. Cur-
rent decreased from 54 amperes to approximately 47 amperes. Details of this
malfunction are given in the section CEHTAUJR GUIDANCE. The second drop in main
missile battery current occurred at approximately T - 0. 9 second when the aft
prelaunch umbilical was ejected. At this time, power to the hydraulic recircu-
lation pump motors was cut off resulting in a 7.5-ampere drop in current. In-
vestigation revealed that recirculation. motors were not turned off manually at
T - 2 minutes as planned. Main missile .battery voltage increased from 27.9 to
28. 25 volts as a result of the decreased load (fig. VIII-2). Voltage increases
appear in steps, since the measurement is commutated at a rate of one sample per
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second. Neither current step decrease had any adverse effect on the electrical
system.
The staging disconnect actuator temperature reached a minimum of 61° F at
lift-off. The red-line temperature was 50° F minimum.
The inverter performance was satisfactory. The inverter skin temperature.,
as indicated by landline measurement, was 61.8° F at lift-off. The inverter
phase voltages varied a maximum of 0. 4 volt throughout launch countdown and up
to vehicle destruct. The voltages for phases A, B> and C were 115.4, 115.8, and
114.5, respectively, during countdown and until flight termination.
Centaur Range Safety Command System
Operation of the Centaur range safety command system was satisfactory
throughout launch operations. Dual receivers were used on the Centaur vehicle.
The automatic gain control (AGC) level of "both receivers was approximately 1200
microvolts at lift-off. Receiver 1 AGC increased to approximately 1830 micro-
volts at T + 3 seconds, while receiver 2 AGC level remained at 1200 microvolts.
Centaur Tracking
Azusa, C-band, and S-band transponders functioned satisfactorily. The
S-band transponder was located on the SD-1 dynamic model, and the Azusa and
C-band beacons were located on the Centaur. Azusa AGC level was -52 decibels,
or 560 microvolts. The Azusa was the only instrumented tracking system.
Telemetry and Instrumentation
Four pulse amplitude modulations (PAM) FM/FM links were carried on AC-5
for Centaur and the dynamic model airborne measurements. Telemetry systems 1
and 2 monitored Centaur vehicle parameters. Telemetry subsystems 2 and 3 moni-
tored the payload environment. Subsystems 1 and 2 were located on the Centaur
vehicle in the forward equipment area. Subsystems 3 and 4 were located in the
retromotor simulator portion of the Surveyor dynamic model. Telemetry system
power output was 3 to 5 watts. Frequencies were as follows:
RF 1
RF 2
RF 3
RF 4
225.
235
243.
251.
7 Me
Me
8 Me
5 Me
Six telemetry system parameters were telemetered including telemetry bat-
tery current, thermocouple reference junction temperature, and four telemetry
package skin temperatures. All parameters were as expected, well within acoep-
table limits. Telemetry battery load current for subsystems 1 and 2 was
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11 amperes. Subsystems 3 and 4 were powered by a separate battery on the dy-
namic model. The reference junction temperature was constant, and the telemetry
package skin temperatures remained at acceptable limits. Subsystems 1 and 2 had
stabilized at approximately 75° F, and the subsystems on the dynamic model
stabilized at approximately 45° F.
Signal strength from the Centaur telemetry packages and from Atlas BF 1
was adequate as shown in figure VIII-3 (ref. 7). Receiver threshold was ap-
proximately 0.75 microvolt. Some flame attenuation is evident at booster
engine ignition but signal strength remained well above receiver threshold
level.
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IX. CENTAUR PROPELLAMT UTILIZATION SYSTEM
AC-5 was the first Centaur vehicle to utilize the newly developed capaci-
tance probe propellant utilization (PU) system (ref. 8). All system checks were
satisfactory during the countdown, and the system showed normal operation up to
the time of vehicle destruct.
The PU System is shown schematically in figure IX-1. The basic operation of
the system is one of sensing and comparing the mass of propellents and correcting
engine flow rates to maintain a desired ratio of oxidizer to fuel in the tanks.
In Centaur, the capacitance probes sense the mass of each propellant and compare
them in the electronics package. If the ratio varies from a predetermined val-
ue, LOX flow to the engines is varied to return the ratio to the proper value.
The launch countdown system checks started at T - 105 seconds. All param-
eters, as shown in table IX-I, were within tolerance. LOX and LH2 quantities
during tanking are shown as a function of time in figure IX-2.
The electronics package skin temperature is shown in figure IX-3. The
temperature remained within the 25° to 129° F limit throughout the countdown.
Centaur Propellant Loading - AC-5
LH2 and LOX were satisfactorily tanked to planned flight levels by the
propellant level indicating system (PLIS). The PLIS also utilized two
100-percent dual element level sensors, one in each tank to ensure loading to
the proper level. The propellant levels and weights at lift-off are presented
in the following table (ref. 9).
Propellant
LOX
LH2
PLIS,
percent
98.7
99.7
Ullage
pressure,
psia
31.2
21.6
Density,
Ib/cu ft
68. 72
4.32
Station,
in.
382.3
190. 32
Volume,
cu ft
354.0
1191. 44
Weight,
Ib
24 330
5 147
75
TABLE IX-I. - COUNTDOWN SYSTEM CHECKS
Time,
min
T - 105
T - 62
T - 54
T - 53
T - 52
T - 5
Checkout function
The engine LOX flow control valves were exercised j
valve rotation rates were 8.7 and 8.0 degrees per
second (allowable is 6 to 12 deg/sec)
The valves crossed over from LOX-rich stops to LH2~
rich stops; the crossover points must satisfy the
following equation:
5LH2 - LOX = 160±500 pounds
LOX = 13. 087
LH2 = 2668 X 5 = 13 340
.'. 5LH2 - LOX = 253 pounds
Same as T - 62 min:
LOX = 19 330
LH2 = 3848 X 5 - 19 240
.'. 5LH2 - LOX = -90 pounds
The full quantity checks must satisfy the following:
LOX = 19 870+1000 pounds •
LH2 = 3880+200 pounds
Measured LOX = . 20 030 pounds
M = 160 pounds
Measured LHg = 3848 pounds
M = -32 pounds
Valve rotation rates:
9.6 and 9.2 degrees per second
Valve rotation rates:
9. .26 and 9.15 degrees per second
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Figure IX-L - Propellant utilization system.
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X. STRUCTURES
Loss of the AC-5 vehicle after approximately 3 seconds precludes any exten-
sive structural performance evaluation. Pressure and temperature environments
were essentially at their prelaunch values and presented no surprises. These
environments have, been adequately substantiated on the previous three successful
flights. Flight loads, both lateral and longitudinal, during the few seconds
immediately following launch are at their minimum values and present no critical
problems. Structural performance was satisfactory prior to loss of the vehicle.
In spite of general mission failure, it was possible to evaluate Atlas in-
termediate bulkhead differential pressure history. Because the uprated booster
engines were used for the first time on the AC-5 vehicle, it was feared that the
differential pressure might attain negative values and result in bulkhead re-
versal. In order to obviate this possibility/ a programed pressure system was
used for the LOX tank ullage. The system was programed to maintain a pressure
of 5 psi less than the 28.5 psig minimum normal flight pressure for the first
20 seconds after launch. Because of the vehicle failure so soon after lift-off,
the return of the LOX tank to the nominal flight pressure range (28.5 to 30.0
psig) could not be substantiated. However, the bulkhead differential pressure
history showed a value of 16.8 psi at T - 10 seconds and 11.9 psi at T + 0.
This indicates that the programed pressure system is adequate to maintain in-
termediate bulkhead structural integrity.
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XI. VEHICLE DYNAMICS
Atlas roll-rate gyro measurement (AS52R, fig. XI-l) indicated a short dura-
tion oscillation at T - 1.5 seconds with a maximum peak to peak (P-P) amplitude
of 1. 7 degrees per second at a frequency of 10 cps. In the payload area at this
flight time, a combined lateral and torsional oscillation of 1 g P-P at a fre-
quency of 11 cps occurred, (fig. XI-2). The excitation source was thought to "be
engine position oscillations during starting transient indicated lay B-l engine
yaw-roll measurement (AS252D, fig. XE-3) as 1.2 degrees maximum P-P gimbaling.
Correlation of AC-5 (165k engines) main stage with other D series Atlas
starts was made by comparing B-l engine yaw feedback voltages (feedback voltage
is proportional to gimbaling angle) with 32 vehicles having 150k engines and
two having 165k engines. As seen in table XI-I, the feedback voltages of the
two 165k engine vehicles were comparable with the feedback voltages of the 150k
engine vehicles. Booster 156D (AC-5) experienced higher than average feedback
voltages and, therefore, gimbaling angles, but eight vehicles have seen ampli-
tudes as high or higher. This correlation .indicated that, during starting tran-
sient, the gimbaling amplitudes were higher than average, but within the normal
deviations seen on other Atlas starts.
A longitudinal oscillation of 0.8 g P-P amplitude at a frequency of 8 cps
occurred at T + 0.3 second of flight (fig. XE-4). It was believed that this
perturbation was caused by Atlas LOX pressurization instability at lift-off.
However, it did not compare well with Atlas LOX pressurization instability os-
cillations at lift-off of 0.35 g P-P and 6 cps, which have been evident on other
Atlas-Centaur flights. More analysis must be performed to ascertain the cause
and possible effect from this oscillation.
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TABLE XT-I. - COMPARISON OF B-l ENGINE YAW FEEDBACK VOLTAGES DURING STARTING
TRANSIENT OF ATLAS D SERIES VEHICLES
[Vehicles 7101, 7102, and 156 had 165k engines. ]
B-l yaw feedback voltage (rms)
0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6
Atlas D vehicle identification number
29
49
14
20
22
48
51
3
7
27
43
56.
67
90
91
10
28
50
83
11
289
7102
26
199
7101
45 17
44
156
216
250
15 195
288
5
82
8
IP
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o5"
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468
0
-467
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o
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Figure Xl-l. - Roll rate gyro signal (AS52R).
1 J-10
-2 -1.5 -1
Flight time, sec
Figure Xl-2. Spacecraft mounting leg accel-
erometer at position 0° and station 125 with
x-x axis sensitivity.
498r
0
-497 _L
10.88
-2 -1 0
Flight time, sec
Figure XI-3. - B-l yaw roll (AS252D),
1 - 2
Flight time, sec
Figure XI-4 - Axial acceleration (CM101A).
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XEI. GROUND-SUPPORT AND LAUNCH-AREA DAMAGE
Summary
Performance of the mechanical ground-support equipment was satisfactory
during the countdown. Temperatures, pressures, and time-sequenced functions
were'maintained within prescribed limits.
Complex damage due to blast forces was not severe and was limited to the
immediate launcher area and secondary structures. Heat damage was extensive on
the launch deck, in the mezzanine of the Launch and Service Building, and on the
umbilical tower.
Ground-Support Equipment
The mechanical ground-support equipment (GSE) operated satisfactorily dur-
ing final preparations and countdown. Although there were no countdown holds
due to GSE operations, a. power outage was experienced at T - 140 minutes (0501
EST) as a result of a fuse link failure in the industrial power supply that
caused a 15-minute delay. Power was switched to "critical power," repairs were
made, and transfer made back to industrial power during the scheduled T - 90
minute hold.
Prelaunch temperatures and pressures were satisfactorily maintained within
limits for propellants and /environmental control.
A total of 28 fixed cameras at nine camera pads were used to give optical
data coverage. Film coverage was good and provided significant detailed sequen-
tial timing of events.
•
Propellants supplied for the launch were:
Liquid hydrogen 21 000 gal
Liquid oxygen 38 000 gal
2 929 galLiquid helium
Gaseous nitrogen
Gaseous helium
28 trailers
6 trailers
1 trailer
12 trailers
3 trailers
First- and second-stage air conditioning
Payload air conditioning
Atlas thrust section heater
Insulation panel purge
LOX storage tank pressurization
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Shortly after the AC-5 launch failure, all tanks and bottles were blown
down to avoid any possible dangers with the propellants. No gas quantity mea-
surements were taken.
Complex Damage
Explosion data were obtained by blast gages and thermal sensors in the
launch; abort monitoring system and by photography. These data indicated three
separate explosions and a possible fourth explosion. Temperatures in excess of
6000° F were measured at the top of the umbilical tower and on the launch deck.
The data, indicated that more of the energy yield was released in thermal form
than in pressure form. This was generally confirmed by actual complex damage.
Except in the immediate vicinity of the launcher, blast damage was limited to
doors, windows, "louvres and similar secondary structures; the basic frameworks
of the service tower, umbilical tower, ramp, and other primary structures were
unaffected. Heat damage was extensive, resulting in complete destruction of
much electrical equipment, pipe insulation, and aluminum handrails. Some of
the damage is shown in the photographs included in this section (figs. XII-1
to 10). In addition to equipment that must, be replaced, there is a general need
to clean, paint,' inspect, test, and revalidate most of the equipment in the pad
area. Damage to specific items of facility and ground-support equipment was as
follows:
Service Tower
The primary tower structure was not damaged. Secondary damage was as
follows:
(1) Some aluminum siding was blown loose.
(2) Windows were shattered.
(3) Fiberglass panels on sliding doors were blown off.
4
(4) Electrical wiring at the southeast corner was destroyed.
(5) About 35 percent of the painted surface suffered heat damage.
Umbilical Tower
The primary tower structure was not damaged. Secondary damage was as
follows :
(1) Approximately 90 percent of the paint on the tower structure was
burned.
(2) All wiring and associated equipment, with the possible exception of
explosion-proof equipment, was damaged beyond repair.
(3) All pipe insulation was burned.
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(4) The majority of piping on the tower suffered heat damage and will re-
quire removal, cleaning, and testing to determine reusability.
Launch and Service Building
(1) Two concrete block walls were blast damaged and require partial re-
placement.
(2) One structural steel beam was bent.
(3) Miscellaneous handrails, ladders-j and doors were damaged beyond repair.
Ramp
The damage was minor and was limited to handrails, stair grating, and vent
louvres. .
Water Pump Building
(1) A door and an air louvre were blown out.
(2) Masonry block walls were cracked.
Propulsion System
.(l) Two liquid-helium Dewars, .located on the ramp near the umbilical tower,
suffered minor damage.
(2) About 50 percent of the liquid-helium transfer lines on the umbilical
tower were damaged beyond repair.
Propellant Systems
(1) The LOX and RP-1 propellant lines in the launcher area were destroyed.
(2) The LH2 vent burner stack was bent, and the electrical conduit was
destroyed.
(3) The LHg flex assemblies from the top level of the umbilical tower to
the Centaur fill and drain valve were destroyed.
(4) Two GH2 flex lines from the vent fin were damaged.
(5) The LOX dump valve was destroyed.
(6) Centaur LOX flow control and boom vent valves were burned.
Air Conditioning System
(l) All duct insulation from the bottom of the umbilical tower to the end
of both booms was damaged.
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(2) The Centaur thrust section heating duct was damaged from the second
to the fifth level of the umbilical tower.
Hydraulic System
(1) All hydraulic lines on the launcher and ramp were destroyed.
(2) The nitrogen charge panel on the ramp and all lines above the ramp to
this panel were destroyed.
(3) The hydraulic pumping unit suffered smoke damage.
Umbilical Booms
The booms suffered heat and blast.damage but no major structural damage.
The booms are to be removed from the tower, disassembled, and refurbished.
Launcher
The launcher was completely destroyed except for a few small components
that may be salvageable.
Pressurization System
(1) The Atlas and Centaur pressurization control units, and the pressure
reducing panel located on the mezzanine of the transfer room, suffered smoke
and corrosion damage. Much of the corrosion resulted from the use of foam-type
fire extinguishers.
(2) All pressure tubing on the launcher was destroyed.
Electrical Systems
(1) Approximately 30 major items of equipment were destroyed. Most of
this equipment was in the transfer room; some was on the ramp and at the base of
the umbilical tower. This equipment consists of racks, junction boxes, relay
boxes, power supplies, and terminal cabinets.
(2) Long-run cables entering the transfer, room from the cable tunnel were
damaged, and require cutoff, splicing, and retermination.
(3) All cabling in the pad area and up the umbilical tower was.damaged
beyond repair.
RF and TV Systems
(1) The RF transmission lines on the umbilical tower and the termination
box at the end of the cable tunnel require replacement.
(2) The C-band and Azusa test sets require replacement.
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(3) Five TV cameras require overhaul due to heat and blast damage. All
cabling to these cameras must be replaced.
Landline Instrumentation
All distribution boxes, cabling, and transducers located on and around the
launcher, umbilical tower, and transfer room were damaged beyond repair.
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Figure Xll-1. - Aerial view showing general damage to pad area.
90
Figure Xll-2. - View of service tower showing damage to Fiberglas panels.
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Figure Xll-3. - View of southeast corner of service tower showing heat damage to electrical wiring.
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Figure XII-4. - View from ramp showing general damage to umbilical tower. Figure XII-5. - Closeup view of umbilical tower showing damage to air-
conditioning ducts.
CO
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Figure Xll-6. - View of launch and service building showing damaged doors. Figure XII-7. - View at top of ramp showing melted aluminum handrails and damage
to grating.
FigureXII-8. - Closeup view of damaged Atlas-Centaur launcher.
Figure Xll-9. - Damaged launcher with vehicle debris in foreground.
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Figure Xll-10. - View at top of ramp showing typical destruction of electrical equipment and cameras.
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APPENDIX
A-C
AFCRL
AFETR
AGC
ac
BECO
cps
CRT
DDW
DSIF
dc
EST
ETR
F -
FACT
FPIP
GD/C
GHg
GMT
GSE
I/A
IGS
k
ABBREVIATIONS
Atlas -Centaur
Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories
Air Force Eastern Test Range
automatic gain control
alternating current
booster engine cutoff
cycles per second
composite readiness test
digital data word
deep space instrumentation facility
direct current
Eastern Standard Time
Eastern Test Range
-days prior to launch day
flight acceptance composite test
fuel pump inlet pressure
General Dynamics/Convair
gaseous hydrogen
Greenwich Mean Time
ground-support equipment
hydrogen peroxide
interstage adapter
inertia! guidance system
thousands of pounds of thrust
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LeRC Lewis Research Center
LHg liquid hydrogen
LOX liquid oxygen
LV-3 launch vehicle 3 Centaur
MECO main engine cutoff
MES main engine start
MGS missile guidance set
PE platform electronics
PLIS propellant level indicating system
P-P peak to peak
PU propellant utilization
psi pounds per square inch
psia pounds per square inch absolute
psid pounds per square inch differential
psig pounds per square inch gage
Q quadrant
QUAD quadrant
quadrants 1, II, III, and IV, respectively
RF radiofrequency
rms root mean square
RP-1 rocket propulsion fuel
rpm . revolutions per minute
RSC range safety command
SD-1 Surveyor dynamic model
SECO sustainer engine • cutoff
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